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Non-White Poverty and Macroeconomy: The Impact of Growth By Gary A. Hoover, Walter Enders, and Donald G. Freeman* Although poverty research has a very long history in the social sciences, serious debate on the sufficiency of economic growth to eliminate poverty was rekindled by the inception of the "War on Poverty" by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations during the early 1960s. Forty years later, the measurement of growth's effect on poverty remains an important input to the policy question of whether, how much, and how govern? ment efforts should address poverty reduction.
Early work by Henry J. Aaron (1967) found that poverty among certain groups seemed highly sensitive to economic growth, while other groups were barely affected. Subsequent researchers have realized that poverty has a spa? tial as well as a demographic dimension, and more recent work has examined poverty by "race and region" using disaggregated time series. The present study further refines the examination of poverty by racial/ethnic group and region by investigating the impact of economic progress on poverty across black, Hispanic, and white populations measured over 35 years at the level of the census region.
To our knowledge, this is the first research to study all three of these groups using regional data. A regional analysis is important because the North, Midwest, South, and West have had different industrial structures and different economic histories over the last three decades. As shown in Figure 1 , regional poverty rates of blacks and Hispanics relative to whites are quite different. Moreover, regional differences exist in the levels and growth rates of real per capital GDP, in the secular decline in manufac? turing, and in the pattern of the unemployment rate. In addition to economic events, we control for demographic differences and for structural economic change so as to capture some of the heterogeneity remaining after disaggregating by racial/ethnic group and region. Given the small number of usable observations and the large number of potential determinants of poverty, we use two empirical approaches.
In the first, the data are pooled by racial/ethnic group across regions. The central idea is that the poverty/growth nexus is common to groups, and the desirable aspects of pooling?greater degrees of freedom and more precise esti? mates?justify the assumed slope homogene?
ity. By using fixed effects, mean heterogeneity across group/region/time can be controlled.
The second approach uses Seemingly Unrela? ted Regressions (SUR) to relax the assumption that the coefficients are equal across racial/eth? nic groups and/or regions by estimating dif? ferent regression equations for each group and region. Efficiency gains can be made since SUR is a system-wide estimation strategy allowing us to capture the information contained in the contemporaneous correlations of the individual regression errors. Using both approaches allows us to test the internal validity of our findings.
The general results confirm that per capita GDP growth and declines in unemployment reduce poverty. The measured effects of GDP growth across groups are uneven, however, and most but not all of our models suggest that black poverty is more sensitive to economic growth than white or Hispanic poverty. Unemployment is a more important determinant of poverty for whites in the pooled time series estimates than for blacks or Hispanics. The pooled time-series approach finds that single parenthood, transfer payments, and wage inequality have significant effects on poverty, while the SUR approach finds economic variables to be often significant but demographic variables to be insignificant.
I. Data and Pooled Estimation
This paper uses official head-count poverty rates for families, computed from the March -,-,_ 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 n?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?r 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 ~i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?r 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 ~i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?i?r 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Poverty rates for whites are far lower than those of blacks and Hispanics in every region and in every time period, and are mostly trend less throughout. Poverty rates for blacks and Hispanics for all regions, except blacks in the Midwest, experienced a sharp and long-lasting drop in the mid-1990s; nevertheless, the black and Hispanic poverty rates are still more than double the rate for whites. The error term is assumed to be i.i.d., except for possible contemporaneous correlation across groups and regions. Because of the uncertain timing for the effects of the regressors, and because of the short-term volatility of the black and Hispanic poverty rates, we convert the data to nonoverlapping dif? ferences of five-year averages of log variables. The choice of a five-year window is based solely on the apparent goodness-of-fit between poverty rates and the main economic variables in our analysis. Because of the very uneven representa? tion of blacks and Hispanics across regions, we use population weighted least squares to insure that the influence of each observation is propor? tional to the population that it represents.
The results of estimating equation (1) The goodness of fit for blacks and whites are about the same, but the Hispanic model explains much less of the variation in Hispanic poverty, and while the signs of the coefficients are consis? tent with blacks and whites, the precision is much lower. Because of the exceedingly dynamic char? acter of the Hispanic population, measurement error is a likely suspect in this case.
The results of the pooled regressions confirm that economic growth is the single most important factor in reducing poverty, especially for blacks, but changes in demographics and wage inequal? ity have offset many of the gains from growth.
IL SUR Analysis
Another way to facilitate the comparison by race and region is to estimate the system in ratio form. Specifically, we use the eight relative pov? erty rates shown in Figure 1 as the dependent variables, and modify equation (1) where the aiGR are regression coefficients, the subscript W refers to whites, and the group sub? script G can refer to either blacks or Hispanics. Note that all coefficients in equation (2) would be zero if the poverty rates in a region were equal across the racial/ethnic groups. However, if GDP growth in a region?say, the South?has a more pronounced effect on reducing white pov? erty than black poverty, a2B,so would be nega? tive (since the poverty rate of blacks would not fall by as much as the rate for whites). Similarly, a\.B,R would be positive if increases in the black/ white unemployment rate acted to increase the relative poverty rate of blacks. The point is that equation (2) Note that the dependent variables in equation (1) are the growth rates of poverty, while the dependent variables in equation (2) are the proportionate levels of poverty. In order to reduce the overparameterization of the model and to pare down the system, we use a simple search procedure. Specifically, for each of the eight values of ln(PovGR/PovWR), we use a standard single-equation stepwise regression procedure to select which regressors to include in the regression. We force each regression to contain an intercept, and at each step a regressor is allowed to enter the regression if the ?-statis? tic for that regressor has a /7-value of no more than 0.10. Once a variable is entered, the other included variables (if any) are checked to ensure that they also have ?-statistics with a p-value of no more than 0.10. If the i-statistic for any vari? able exceeds the 0.10 threshold, it is excluded from the regression. The results, excluding the intercept and demo?
graphic variables, are shown in Table 2 . We obtain similar results when we combine only the same-region equations or only the same group equations. We note that PRWORA acted to reduce the relative poverty rates of blacks in the Northeast and in the South. In addition, increases in the relative unemployment of blacks in the Northeast and of Hispanics in the Midwest and South acted to increase the poverty rate of both groups relative to that of whites.
When significant, increases in GDP growth increase the relative poverty rate of blacks and Hispanics. Even though GDP growth reduces poverty, the benefits of GDP growth act to improve the relative fortune of whites.
There is no simple way to categorize the effects of robust growth in that it reduced the relative fortunes of blacks in the NE but improved the relative fortunes of Hispanics in the Midwest. More interesting, perhaps, are some of the variables that are not significant. None of the standard economic variables (GDP growth, robust growth, manufacturing and unemploy? ment) explains black/white poverty rates in the Midwest and South, and one of the coefficients is marginally significant for the West. Similarly, Hispanic/white poverty rates are not affected by any of the traditional economic variables in the Northeast or in the West.
III. Conclusions: The Long and the Short of Poverty
The pooled estimates using five-year aver?
ages better capture the long-term influences of poverty and are more likely to find signifi? cant factors such as family structure and wage inequality. The SUR estimates are better suited to capture the short-run effects of economic events on poverty such as cyclical changes in GDP growth and unemployment rates. Both approaches reinforce the point that Aaron made over 40 years ago: measuring economic growth's effect on poverty is not one-size-fits all; growth affects different groups differently.
By examining poverty in "race and region," we find black poverty about two and one-half times more sensitive to GDP growth than white or Hispanic poverty. The panel estimates of Table 1 indicate that white poverty reacts more strongly to changes in unemployment than either black or Hispanic poverty. However, when disaggregated by region and group, we find a different result. In particular, black poverty in the Northeast and Hispanic poverty in the Midwest and South rise relative to white poverty.
Otherwise, the SUR analysis is broadly con? sistent with the pooled results, at least insofar as the signs of the economic variables are con?
cerned, but the short length of the time series and the overparameterization of the models make it difficult to estimate the effects precisely in all cases.
